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SECURITIES LAW

The Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 section 10(b), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78j(b) (1934), requires disclosure of material information in the purchase
and sale of securities. In order to state a claim for violations of section
10(b)and its corresponding Rule 10b-5, plaintiffs must allege that the defendant, in the course of a securities transaction, either knowingly made a
false statement of material fact or knowingly omitted a material fact that
made the transaction misleading, such that the plaintiff suffered a loss.
However, the defendant's silence or omission of a material fact only violates
section 10(b) if the defendant also has a duty to the plaintiff to disclose
5

the misrepresentation.
The Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct for attorneys impose a
similar responsibility on lawyers. That is, an attorney may have an ethical
duty either to withdraw from the representation or to disclose a misrepresentation made by one of the parties in a securities transaction.5 6 However,
the ethical duty the Rules of Professional Conduct impose does not corre57
spond exactly with a legal duty to disclose under the federal securities laws.
Although a plaintiff cannot base a claim for a violation of federal securities
laws solely on a defendant's violation of ethical standards, this situation
obviously creates tension between ethical and legal considerations. The
question of whether an attorney owes a duty to third parties, in a business

employee becomes aware of full impact of harm); Brown v. I.T.T./Continental Baking Co.,
921 F.2d 289, 294 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (reaffirming Stancil); J.M. Martinac Shipbuilding v.
Director of Office of Workers Compensation Programs, 900 F.2d 180, 183-84 (9th Cir. 1990)
(citing Stancil and concluding that period does not begin until employee is aware or should
be aware of impairment of earning capacity); Johnson v. Director of Office of Workers
Compensation Programs, 911 F.2d 247, 249-50 (9th Cir. 1990) (notiig rule for occupational
diseases applies just as well to latent injuries and citing Stancil for proposition that "injury"
means consequence of accident, which need not occur simultaneously with accident); Brown
v. Jacksonville Shipyards Inc., 893 F.2d 294, 296 (lth Cir. 1990) (applying rule of Stancil);
Bechtel Assoc., P.C. v. Sweeney, 834 F.2d 1029, 1033 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (interpreting 1972
amendment as meaning limitation period begins when claimant knows or should know 1)
injury causally related to employment and 2) injury is impairing capacity to earn wages).
55. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228 (1980); Barker v. Henderson, Franklin,
Starnes & Holt, 797 F.2d 490, 496 (7th Cir. 1986).
56. The Maryland State Bar Committee on Ethics, according to the plaintiffs, ruled that
attorneys have an ethical duty to withdraw or disclose misrepresentation in a securities
transaction. Schatz v. Rosenberg, 943 F.2d 485 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied sub nom. Schatz
v. Weinberg & Green, 112 S. Ct. 1475 (1992). The court noted that the opinion responded to
an anonymous request by the plaintiffs' counsel in the present case. Id. at 492.
57. See, e.g., Tew v. Arky, Feed, Stearns, Watson, Greer, Weaver & Harris, P.A., 655
F. Supp. 1573 (S.D. Fla. 1987), aff'd mem., 846 F.2d 753 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S.
854 (1988) (holding that violation of disciplinary rule did not create legal duty requiring law
firm to disclose information learned in prior business dealing to client's auditors); Bickel v.
Mackie, 447 F. Supp. 1376, 1383-84 (N.D. Iowa), aff'd mem., 590 F.2d 341 (8th Cir. 1978)
(refusing to use ethical code to define civil liability standards); Merrit-Chapman & Scott Corp.
v. Elgin Coal, Inc., 358 F. Supp. 17, 22 (E.D. Tenn. 1972), aff'd mem., 477 F. 2d 598 (6th
Cir. 1973) (refusing to use conduct code as standard for civil liability).
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transaction involving fraud by the attorney's client, makes the situation
more problematic.
The Fourth Circuit, in Schatz v. Rosenberg, 943 F.2d 485 (4th Cir.
1991), cert. denied sub nom. Schatz v. Weinberg & Green, 112 S. Ct. 1475
(1992), considered whether an attorney who failed to disclose material
information to a third party in a securities transaction had violated a legal
or ethical duty to disclose. Ivan and Joann Schatz, the plaintiffs, sold
several businesses to Mark E. Rosenberg and MER Enterprises, a holding
company Rosenberg had created for the purchases. The Schatzes sued
Rosenberg, MER Enterprises, and Rosenberg's law firm, Weinberg & Green,
alleging that the defendants had violated Federal securities laws.
The case against Weinberg & Green stems from Rosenberg's purchase
of two companies owned by the Schatzes. In December 1986, MER Enterprises (MER) bought an eighty percent interest in the two Schatz companies,
paying for the purchase with $1.5 million in promissory notes. Rosenberg
personally guaranteed the notes. The Schatzes relied on a financial statement
from March 1986, and an update letter delivered on the closing date. These
documents, indicating Rosenberg's net worth to be more than $7 million,
contained several misrepresentations. In fact, Rosenberg's largest business
filed for bankruptcy in September 1987, and Rosenberg himself filed for
personal bankruptcy soon afterward. Weinberg & Green represented Rosenberg throughout.
Rosenberg defaulted on his promissory notes, never paying the Schatzes.
In addition, the Schatzes lost $150,000 that they had loaned to the company
formed by merging their companies (of which Rosenberg owned eighty
percent) with another Rosenberg company. Rosenberg siphoned off much
of the operating capital from the Schatz companies, used some of the cash
reserves to pay Weinberg & Green's legal fees, and generally rendered the
companies worthless by the time he filed for bankruptcy in 1987.
The Schatzes filed a seven-count complaint, including three counts
against Weinberg & Green. The Schatzes alleged that the law firm violated
section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act (Count III); that the firm
aided and abetted Rosenberg in his securities violations (Count IV); and
that the firm was guilty of common law misrepresentation (Count VII). The
Federal District Court referred the case to a magistrate judge, who recommended that all three counts against the law firm be dismissed.
The magistrate dismissed Count III, finding that the plaintiffs did not
state a cause of action for violation of section 10(b). In order to state a
claim, the Schatzes would have had to allege either that Weinberg & Green
owed the Schatzes an independent duty to disclose, or that the law firm
had made some affirmative misrepresentation about Rosenberg's financial
situation. Similarly, the magistrate dismissed Count VI because the plaintiffs
did not allege that Weinberg & Green had "caused," or aided and abetted,
Rosenberg's fraud. Finally, the magistrate dismissed Count VII, commonlaw misrepresentation, because absent a duty to disclose to third parties,
mere silence or failure to disclose is not a fraud.
The district court accepted the magistrate's recommendation to dismiss
the complaints against Weinberg & Green. The Schatzes moved for recon-
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sideration after obtaining an opinion from the State Bar Committee on
Ethics, concerning the law firm's duty to disclose. The district court denied
the motion, and the Schatzes appealed to the Fourth Circuit. Reviewing de
novo the district court's decision, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the dismissal
of all three complaints against the law firm.
The Schatzes argued that the firm committed fraud by remaining silent
about Rosenberg's financial insolvency and false financial statements, and
that the firm's representation of Rosenberg involved them throughout in
the transactions between the Schatzes and Rosenberg. The firm prepared
closing documents for the sale, and forwarded to the Schatzes both those
documents and a separate letter from Rosenberg stating that his financial
situation had not changed adversely since the March 1986 report. The firm
also agreed to language in the purchase agreement stating that Rosenberg's
financial representations were accurate in all material respects.
The Fourth Circuit considered each of the Schatzes' arguments in turn.
To resolve the issue of Weinberg & Green's alleged violation of section
10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act, the Fourth Circuit borrowed a
test from the Seventh Circuit. Citing Schlifke v. Seafirst Corp., 866 F.2d
935, 943 (7th Cir. 1989), the court laid out the required elements of a claim
for violations of section 10(b) and of Rule lOb-5. The plaintiff must allege
that the defendant (1) knowingly omitted or knowingly made a false
statement of material fact, (2) during a securities transaction, (3) causing
the statements in the transaction to be misleading, (4) and causing the
plaintiff's loss. However, the court first must determine whether the defendant had a duty to disclose information to the plaintiff.
In applying this test, the Fourth Circuit first considered whether Weinberg & Green's silence about Rosenberg's financial condition violated section
10(b). Citing Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228 (1980), the court
agreed that a firm would have a duty to disclose if a confidential relationship
existed, but questioned whether the duty would exist absent such a relationship. The court declined to follow several district court decisions cited
by the plaintiffs, including Rose v. Arkansas Valley Environmental& Utility
Authority, 562 F. Supp. 1180 (W.D. Mo. 1983). Instead, the court held
that a lawyer or law firm cannot be held liable for section 10(b) misrepresentation absent some fiduciary or other confidential relationship creating
a duty to disclose.
The court cited Barker v. Henderson, Franklin, Starnes & Holt, 797
F.2d 490, 496 (7th Cir. 1986), for the proposition that a duty to disclose
results from the confidential attorney-client relationship, rather than from
any federal securities law requirement. Thus, silence alone, absent a confidential or fiduciary relationship, does not violate section 10(b). Quoting
Barker the court stated, "[n]either lawyers nor accountants are required to
tattle on their clients in the absence of some duty to disclose. To the
contrary, attorneys have privileges not to disclose." 58 The court cited deci58. Schatz v. Rosenberg, 943 F.2d 485, 491 (4th Cir. 1991) (citations omitted), cert.
denied sub nom. Schatz v. Weinberg & Green, 112 S. Ct. 1475 (1992).
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sions from other circuits to support this holding, including Renovitch v.
Kaufman, 905 F.2d 1040 (7th Cir. 1990); First Interstate Bank v. Chapman
& Cutler, 837 F.2d 775, 780 n.4 (7th Cir. 1988); and Abell v. Potomac
Insurance Co., 858 F.2d 1104 (5th Cir.), reh.denied, 863 F.2d 882 (5th Cir.
1988), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Fryar v. Abell, 492 U.S. 914
(1989).
The plaintiffs used several strategies to argue that Weinberg & Green
in fact did have a duty to the Schatzes. The plaintiffs tried to base the
duty to disclose on Maryland's Rules of Professional Conduct. The plaintiffs
argued that the Rules required the law firm either to withdraw from
representing Rosenberg or to disclose. The plaintiffs based their argument
on an advisory opinion by the State Bar Committee on Ethics, handed
down as a result of an anonymous request by the plaintiffs' attorneys.
However, the Fourth Circuit rejected the plaintiffs' arguments, relying on
contrary decisions from the Eighth, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits as well as
from district courts. Instead, the court held that ethical codes cannot be
used to define civil liability standards for attorneys, nor can the codes be
used as the basis for securities fraud or other misrepresentation claims.
Second, the Fourth Circuit considered whether, even absent a duty to
disclose, the law firm's involvement in drafting documents for the sale
constituted affirmative misrepresentation in primary violation of section
10(b). The Fourth Circuit read Abell v. Potomac Ins. Co., 858 F.2d 1104,
1124-25 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied, 863 F.2d 882 (5th Cir. 1988), vacated on
other grounds sub nom. Fryer v. Abell, 492 U.S. 914 (1989), to hold
attorneys liable to third parties only when the attorney has prepared an
opinion letter explicitly giving the attorney's legal opinion, specifically for
the use or benefit of the third party. In the present case, by contrast, the
court found only that the law firm "failed to tattle on their client", who
himself misrepresented his financial status. Weinberg & Green did not
actually solicit the deal or take affirmative steps to misrepresent Rosenberg's
financial condition, but only "papered the deal." Thus, the court refused
to hold the firm liable for primary violations of section 10(b). Citing
Friedman v. Arizona World Nurseries, Ltd., 730 F. Supp. 521 (S.D.N.Y.
1990), aff'd sub nom. Clark v. Arizona World Nurseries Ltd., 927 F.2d
594 (2d Cir. 1991), the court held that drafting and forwarding documents
which contain a client's misrepresentations did not violate securities regulations. The court also used Friedman to hold that under agency theory, a
law firm that acts as a scrivener for a deal already substantially complete
is not liable for violations of section 10(b). As a matter of law, the court
held that an attorney's transmission of inaccuracies does not transform the
client's misrepresentation into an affirmative misrepresentation by the attorney.
The plaintiffs also argued that the firm had affirmatively violated section
10(b) by acting negligently. The court disposed of this claim by returning
to their finding that the firm owed no duty to the plaintiffs. The court
distinguished the present case, where Weinberg & Green represented only
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Rosenberg, from the case cited by plaintiffs, 5wherein
an attorney tried to
9
represent both sides in a securities transaction.
The plaintiffs' claim for tortious misrepresentation in" violation of
Maryland law also depended on the law firm's having a duty to disclose
the misrepresentation. Finding no such duty to the Schatzes, the court
dismissed this claim. Similarly, the court found that the plaintiffs did not
state valid claims that the firm had aided and abetted Rosenberg's violations.
First, the firm had no duty to the Schatzes, and second, the firm had not
provided "substantial assistance" to Rosenberg, but had only acted as a
scrivener. The court held that the "substantial assistance" requirement of
the aiding and abetting claim was not satisfied unless the law firm assisted
in the actual securities law violation, rather than merely assisting the person
who committed the violation. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the claims against the law firm without concurring or dissenting
opinions. The Supreme Court denied the plaintiffs' petition for certiorari
in Schatz v. Weinberg & Green, 112 S. Ct. 1475 (1992).
The Fourth Circuit's dismissal of the claims against Weinberg & Green
brings the Circuit into line with several other Circuits whose decisions are
cited by the court in Schatz.6 The Seventh Circuit has cited Schatz with
approval, in Ackerman v. Schwartz, 947 F.2d 841, 846 (7th Cir. 1991). The
effect of the decision, which dismisses claims against a law firm that failed
to "blow the whistle" on a client's fraudulent financial representations,
creates a tension between the legal standard and ethical codes of attorney
conduct requiring withdrawal or disclosure. The Fourth Circuit, aware of
this conflict, referred to the possibility of some form of non-legal sanction
for this type of unethical conduct. Reluctant to overreach by incorporating
ethical standards into securities laws, the court concluded, "an award of
damages under the securities laws is not the way to blaze the trail toward
improved ethical standards ....

Liability depends on an existing duty to

disclose. The securities laws therefore must lag behind ethical and fiduciary
standards." 6'

59. See Crest Inv. Trust, Inc. v. Comstock, 327 A.2d 891, 906 (Md. App. 1974) (holding
that attorney's duty to disclose to clients on both sides of transaction created conflict of

interest).
60. See Renovitch v. Kaufman, 905 F.2d 1040, 1048 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding attorneys,
like accountants, not liable for failure to disclose to non-client third party); First Interstate
Bank v. Chapman & Cutler, 837 F.2d 775, 778 (7th Cir. 1988) (same); Abell v. Potomac Ins.
Co., 858 F.2d 1104, 1135 (5th Cir.) (same), reh. denied, 863 F.2d 882 (5th Cir. 1988), vacated
on other groundssub nom. Fryar v. Abell, 492 U.S. 914 (1989); Friedman v. Arizona World
Nurseries, Ltd., 730 F. Supp. 521, 531 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (holding attorney who drafted and
forwarded documents not liable for client's misrepresentations contained therein), aff'd sub
nom. Clark v. Arizona World Nurseries, 927 F.2d 594 (2d Cir. 1991).
61. Schatz v. Henderson, 943 F.2d 485, 498 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied sub nom.
Schatz v. Weinberg & Green, 112 S. Ct. 1475 (1992), quoting Barker v. Henderson, Franklin,
Starnes & Holt, 797 F.2d 490, 497 (7th Cir. 1986).

